Why Britain Invaded Afghanistan in 1839: The Fear of Russia That Led to War- Part One
Why would Britain send an army deep into Afghanistan when the country itself posed no direct threat to British territory?
image info:Entrance to the Bolan Pass from DadurArmy of the Indus used the Bolan Pass during the 1839 invasion of Afghanistan.
Today I want to start a new series looking at the First Anglo-Afghan War, one of the most disastrous conflicts of the Victorian era. Over the next few weeks, I want to look at why Britain became involved in Afghanistan, how the campaign initially seemed to succeed, and how events eventually led to the terrible retreat from Kabul.
To understand why British troops went into Afghanistan in 1839, we need to look beyond Afghanistan.
Much of India was controlled by the British East India Company. India was enormously important to British trade, wealth and influence, and British officials were constantly worried about anything that might threaten their position there.
One of their greatest fears was Russia.
During the early 19th century, the Russian Empire was expanding south through Central Asia. British politicians and military officials were becoming increasingly concerned that Russian influence might eventually reach Afghanistan and that it may even threaten British-controlled India.
This rivalry between Britain and Russia later became known as the Great Game.
Afghanistan was situated between the Russian Empire in the north and British India to the south-east, which made it hugely important.
At the time, Dost Mohammad Khan was the most powerful ruler in Afghanistan and controlled Kabul.
Afghanistan had been divided by years of rivalry following the decline of the Durrani Empire. Dost Mohammad had gradually emerged from these struggles and took control of Kabul in 1826. But he faced serious problems of his own.
One of the most important concerned the city of Peshawar.
Peshawar had previously been under Afghan control but had been captured by the Sikh Empire, ruled by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Dost Mohammad wanted British help to recover the city.
The British, however, had already developed an important relationship with Ranjit Singh and were unwilling to support an Afghan attack against him.
So Dost Mohammad started looking elsewhere for help.
In 1837, a Russian representative, Captain Ivan Vitkevich, arrived in Kabul. To British officials, his presence appeared to confirm their fears that Russia was attempting to gain influence over Afghanistan.
Britain also had its own representative in Kabul, Alexander Burnes.
Burnes had been sent to negotiate with Dost Mohammad and explore the possibility of strengthening relations between Afghanistan and British India.
Dost Mohammad was willing to cooperate, but he again raised the question of Peshawar.
British officials refused to support his claim.
With negotiations failing and a Russian representative also present in Kabul, the British government in India increasingly began to view Dost Mohammad as unreliable.
At around the same time, Persia, with Russian support, was besieging the Afghan city of Herat. To British officials, this made the threat appear even more serious and increased their fears that Russian influence could spread closer to India.
Instead, they decided to support another man.
Shah Shuja Durrani had once ruled Afghanistan but had been driven from power many years before. He was living in exile under British protection.
British officials believed that if Shah Shuja could be restored to the Afghan throne, he would become a friendly ruler who could help prevent Russian influence from spreading towards India.
In October 1838, the Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland, issued what became known as the Simla Manifesto.
It attempted to justify British intervention in Afghanistan and presented the restoration of Shah Shuja as necessary for the security of British India.
An agreement had already been made between the British, Shah Shuja and Ranjit Singh.
The plan was now clear.
Dost Mohammad would be removed.
Shah Shuja would be restored.
And Afghanistan would, British officials hoped, become a reliable barrier between Russian expansion and British India.
Late in 1838, a large force known as the Army of the Indus began preparing to advance into Afghanistan.
At first, British leaders expected the campaign to be relatively straightforward.
Instead, their decision to interfere in Afghan politics would begin a chain of events that ended in one of the most famous military disasters of the 19th century.
In Part Two, I want to look at how the British army entered Afghanistan and how Shah Shuja was placed back on the throne.